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To be as prepared as possible for the next ﬁ  nancial crisis, we should not embark on a long list of detailed 
proposals that we believe might have prevented the last one. Instead, we should strengthen existing 
regulatory frameworks to take into account their fundamental shortcomings highlighted by the recent crisis. 
This improvement should focus on the essentials and be based on a few simple principles so as to be 
robust against unforeseen events. We have to get these key elements right to ensure that the next episode 
of stress in ﬁ  nancial markets is less disruptive and costly than the current one.
NB: The author would like to thank Aditya Narain, Deputy Division Chief in the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department, for his valuable contribution. 
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessary reﬂ  ect those of the BIS.
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M
ost observers agree that the origins of 
the ongoing ﬁ  nancial crisis were broad 
and complex.1 First, and primarily, there 
was a market failure characterised by deﬁ  cient 
risk management practices, inadequate relaxation 
of credit standards (especially in the US mortgage 
markets), uncontrolled ﬁ  nancial innovation, lack of 
investor due diligence and abuses of various sorts in 
the ﬁ  nancial industry. Second, excessive leverage and 
risk appetite were favoured by the combination of an 
extended period of unusually low interest rates and 
large global imbalances. Finally, various weaknesses 
of regulatory and supervisory arrangements also 
contributed to the crisis, not least because they were 
unable to address the market failures in a timely 
fashion. Accordingly the focus of this Special Issue 
of the Banque de France Financial Stability Review 
is devoted to the future of ﬁ  nancial regulation, 
so I will limit myself to this last aspect.
Reflecting a growing convergence of views 
among private sector participants, academics, 
national authorities and international institutions, 
strengthening the regulatory framework has been an 
important objective of much of the work currently 
under way to draw lessons from the present crisis. 
On April 2009, for instance, the Leaders of the G20 
pledged to “strengthen ﬁ  nancial regulation to rebuild 
trust”. The international community wants to enhance 
regulation to lessen the impact of future ﬁ  nancial 
crises, and this is a highly commendable objective.
Strengthening financial regulation will require 
substantial medium-term work. This might receive less 
attention than the more immediate crisis resolution 
tasks, since restoring stability, conﬁ  dence and the 
proper functioning of markets is a ﬁ  rst priority. 
But embarking on this long journey will also have 
beneﬁ  ts today. This crisis has very distinctive features 
and its resolution is likely to be protracted. Time 
will be needed to repair balance sheets, deleverage, 
revamp the business models of the various types of 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and allow asset prices to ﬁ  nd a 
new equilibrium. From this perspective, clarifying the 
medium-term orientation of the regulatory framework 
can be very useful: it will help restore conﬁ  dence in 
a sustainable way, thereby smoothing the adjustment 
process in the short-term.
If history is any guide, herding behaviour is common 
and people tend to be overly myopic and euphoric 
when things go well. This means that once the current 
“bust” is over —and even though it may still take 
substantial time— it is likely to be followed by a 
renewed “boom”, characterised by increased risk 
appetite, outright optimism and excessive focus on 
short-term gains, not least in the ﬁ  nancial industry. 
Hence it is important to start reﬂ  ecting now on the 
steps needed to strengthen regulation in a way that 
would both reduce the probability of future adverse 
systemic events and mitigate their impact when 
they occur.
Against this backdrop, current regulatory reform 
proposals aim at meeting the following objectives:
￿  Better regulation so as to strengthen standards and 
promote a macroprudential approach that, by taking 
a system-wide view, better addresses procyclical 
effects and extends the perimeter of regulation and 
oversight.
￿  Better disclosure by enhancing market discipline 
and setting up a more informed monitoring of risks 
in the ﬁ  nancial system.
￿ Better architecture by enhancing regulatory 
cooperation, through joint assessments of systemic 
risks, early warning exercises, supervision and 
resolution of cross-border ﬁ  rms.
￿  Better market infrastructure by favouring the creation 
of platforms for counterparty clearing systems for 
over-the-counter derivatives.
￿  Better procedures for crisis management by, for 
instance, conducting early warning exercises and 
planning for cross-border crisis management.
Had these elements been in place before the crisis, 
the situation of the global ﬁ  nancial system would 
most likely have been much better. This is why it 
is important to fully support the work currently 
undertaken by standard-setting bodies, the G20, the 
International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) —now re-established as the Financial 
Stability Board— etc. But we should ask ourselves 
1  See IMF, “Initial lessons of the crisis”, prepared by the Research, Monetary and Capital Markets, and Strategy, Policy, and Review Departments, 6 February 2009; 
and Hervé Hannoun, “Policy lessons from the recent ﬁ  nancial market turmoil”, speech at the XLV Meeting of Central Bank Governors of the American Continent, 
Ottawa, 8–9 May 2008.
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what the true test of these reforms in the future will be. 
In other words, what are the key points among the 
various elements listed above that must be ﬁ  rmly in 
place to avoid the reoccurrence of a costly systemic 
crisis like the current one?
While there is no simple answer to this question, 
the consensus view is that there is a need to work 
on strengthening ﬁ  nancial regulation along the 
lines highlighted above. However, there is the risk 
of overregulation that would be detrimental to global 
well-being. There is a natural and unavoidable 
increase in risk-taking during upturns that is essential 
to growth and innovation. The call for better regulation 
may rapidly result in more regulation. It is desirable 
to achieve a reasonable balance between innovation 
and stability objectives. 
Lastly, focusing our attention on too many regulatory 
changes raises the risk that we lose sight of the 
overall objective: the prevention of excessive risk 
accumulation that can have costly consequences. 
Hence, to be as prepared as possible for the next 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, we should not embark on a long list 
of detailed proposals that we believe might have 
prevented the last one. Instead, we should strengthen 
existing regulatory frameworks to take into account 
their fundamental shortcomings highlighted by the 
recent crisis. This improvement should focus on the 
essentials and be based on a few, simple key principles 
so as to be robust against unforeseen events. In this 
spirit, I will now review the six key elements we have 
to get right to ensure that the next episode of stress 
in ﬁ  nancial markets is less disruptive and costly than 
the current one.
1| GETTING REGULATION RIGHT 
IS NOT ENOUGH
Strengthening regulation and supervision alone will 
not be sufﬁ  cient to prevent the next systemic crisis. 
In particular, the macro policy environment should also 
help to moderate the build-up of excessive risk when 
the economy is doing well. Indeed, macroeconomic 
policies should not only be used to deal with the 
aftermath of the collapse of an asset price bubble; 
they can play an instrumental role in mitigating 
the build-up of ﬁ  nancial excesses in the ﬁ  rst place.2
The role of monetary and ﬁ  scal policies clearly stands 
out, even though there are important limitations on 
how they can be implemented in practice. In the 
run-up to the current crisis, central banks retained 
their focus on maintaining price stability. Against the 
backdrop of low interest rates, the task of addressing 
the implications of surging asset prices and leverage 
was thus de facto left to the supervisory authorities. 
However, regulation alone cannot counteract booms. 
We should also focus on how monetary policies should 
be designed to “lean against the wind”. On the ﬁ  scal 
side we have to redouble efforts to ensure prudent 
policies in good times. As the current turmoil has 
once more reminded us, those countries that do 
not take advantage of the good times to run down 
their deﬁ  cits are ill-equipped to rescue their ﬁ  nancial 
systems and stabilise output if and when the needs 
arise; in addition, the ﬁ  scal tool could prove quite 
effective in moderating demand and pre-empting 
ﬁ  nancial excesses in periods of boom.
Moreover, the capacity of regulation and supervision 
to prevent a ﬁ  nancial crisis should not be overstated 
either. We do not live in a zero probability world, and 
regulation will never be able to entirely eliminate the 
risk of a ﬁ  nancial crisis. What well-designed regulation 
can do and should aim for is to lower the probability 
of such a tail event and, should it occur, to strengthen 
the ﬁ  nancial system’s ability to withstand it.
So my ﬁ  rst key element is that getting regulation 
right will help achieve its objective of minimising 
the probability of crises and reducing their 
costs if, and only if, it is accompanied by “better 
measures”: better macroeconomic policies, better 
risk management in the ﬁ  nancial industry, better 
crisis management frameworks, better system-wide 
liquidity management, better market infrastructure, 
etc.3 All these elements should be mutually reinforcing 
in order to enhance ﬁ  nancial stability.
2  See William White, “Is price stability enough?”, BIS Working Papers, No. 205, 2006.
3  One of the lessons of recent crisis is that poor consumer/investor protection regulation may also have important systemic implications. Therefore, and although 
the focus of this article is on prudential regulation, sound consumer/investor protection frameworks can also contribute decisively to ﬁ  nancial stability.
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2| MAKE THE MACROPRUDENTIAL 
  FRAMEWORK OPERATIONAL
My second key element, advocated by the BIS for 
many years, is that we adopt a system-wide orientation 
of regulatory and supervisory frameworks. Such a 
macroprudential approach, now widely supported, 
should work to capture system-wide risks and their 
interplay with the macro economy. The approach 
has two dimensions: the “cross-sectional dimension”, 
which concerns the distribution of risk in the whole 
ﬁ  nancial system at a point in time, and the “time 
dimension”, which has to do with how aggregate risk 
in the ﬁ  nancial system evolves over time.4 The former 
addresses the existence of common exposures and 
interlinkages in the ﬁ  nancial system, regardless 
of the legal form of the ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms involved. 
The latter deals with the mechanisms through which 
the ﬁ  nancial system and the macroeconomy amplify 
business ﬂ  uctuations and can generate ﬁ  nancial 
instability (“procyclicality”). 
The key policy issue is how regulation and supervision 
can be adjusted to put appropriate safeguards in these 
two areas in place, making these concepts operational 
and developing the necessary tools. Let me now 
address separately each of the two equally important 
dimensions of the macroprudential approach.
2|1 The  cross-sectional  dimension: 
  enlarging the regulation perimeter
In the past, financial regulation relied on two 
basic principles. One was that only (or almost 
exclusively) banks can be systemic and should 
therefore be regulated. The second was that a good 
view of what is happening in the ﬁ  nancial system 
can be learned by looking through these regulated 
institutions. As a result, only those institutions 
deemed to have signiﬁ  cant public policy importance 
(e.g. deposit-takers) faced well-deﬁ  ned prudential 
regulation. This was not the case for other ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms performing similar activities or which were 
important counterparties. Regulation operated in 
silos, based on the legal form of an institution rather 
than its functional activity. The industry responded 
by creating vehicles, instruments and entities that 
existed in the shadow of the formal ﬁ  nancial system. 
A telling example is the shadow banking system in 
the United States, which is estimated to be nearly the 
same size as the country’s regulated banking system.
The current crisis has shown that this approach to 
regulation must change, to: 
(i) focus on functions/objectives (e.g. ﬁ  nancial stability, 
consumer protection) rather than institutions; and 
(ii) assess risks for the system as a whole and not 
just for individual ﬁ  rms. Such re-orientation has to be 
backed by the development of new techniques and 
processes allowing for a macroprudential assessment 
of systemic risk.
A key task is to make the scope of regulation more 
appropriate. Broadening the focus of regulation 
from the ﬁ  rm to the system-wide level requires 
expanding the existing regulatory perimeter so that 
risks developing in the shadows of the supervised 
banking system can be recognised and addressed. 
A tiered approach has been proposed.5 First, collect 
data capturing periodic information from an expanded 
set of institutions, instruments and markets that 
are outside the core present regulatory perimeter. 
Second, select those institutions that are deemed 
important from the point of view of their contribution 
to systemic risk, based on a range of parameters 
(e.g.  size, interconnectedness, funding model). 
Third, apply to these selected institutions the type of 
(but not necessarily the same) prudential regulation 
that is in place for the ﬁ  rms belonging to the narrower, 
inner perimeter.
The concept is simple in design but may present 
significant operational challenges. One is that 
supervisors would require the legal ability to identify 
institutions in either perimeter, and clearer rules 
on the consolidation of off-balance sheet risks to 
enhance the assessment of the contribution of a single 
institution to system-wide risks. Supervisors would 
also need the capacity to act. In particular, speciﬁ  c 
procedures would have to be set up to wind down 
in an orderly fashion those institutions selected for 
4  See Borio (2009) “Implementing the macroprudential approach to ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision”.
5  See IMF, “Lessons of the ﬁ  nancial crisis for future regulation of ﬁ  nancial institutions and markets and for liquidity management”, prepared by the Monetary 
and Capital Markets Department, 4 February 2009.
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the importance of their contribution to systemic risk 
and considered as non-viable, in order to avoid the 
“too big to fail” problem and associated moral hazard 
issues. Lastly, consistent standards and tools would 
need to be developed across countries and sectors 
to prevent regulatory arbitrage, requiring better 
supervisory coordination. In particular, ensuring that 
a comprehensive consolidated supervision framework 
was applied to all the ﬁ  nancial institutions deemed to 
be within the perimeter of institutions of system-wide 
importance would be essential.
Of course, the framework presented above should be 
complemented by speciﬁ  c arrangements for dealing 
with institutions that are not deemed as contributing 
to systemic risk, as is the case with deposit insurance 
coverage for commercial banks of limited size.
2|2 The  time  dimension: 
dealing with procyclicality 
while preserving risk sensitivity
As regards the time dimension of the macroprudential 
approach, the current crisis has underscored that 
addressing procyclicality in the ﬁ  nancial system 
must be a key priority. From this perspective, some 
observers have focused on the higher risk sensitivity 
of minimum capital requirements associated with 
the recent evolution in banking regulation, arguing 
that this could lead to unwelcome procyclicality. 
This is a distinct possibility. At the same time, what 
is not sufﬁ  ciently appreciated is that greater risk 
sensitivity is needed. Not least, if properly structured, 
it can encourage earlier recognition and mitigation 
of emerging risks, helping to forestall an unexpected 
and sudden call on capital later on. Indeed, one of 
the most procyclical forces in the current ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has been the failure of risk management and 
capital frameworks to capture key risks. When banks 
and market participants realised what the true risks 
were, they retrenched at the worst possible time, 
amplifying the impact on the real economy.
In addition to risk sensitivity, another important 
feature of existing banking regulations that should 
be preserved in order to dampen procyclicality 
is the independence of the supervisory process. 
Past experience suggests that a lack of independence 
of supervisory authorities can indeed contribute 
signiﬁ  cantly to procyclicality in both good and bad times.
There are a number of ways to reduce any potential 
procyclical bias in the regulatory framework and in 
particular feedback effects between the ﬁ  nancial 
system and the real economy. Two important ones 
relate to provisioning and capital standards. Together, 
if properly designed, they should capture both 
expected and unexpected losses, fully taking into 
account the evolution of risk during business and 
ﬁ  nancial cycles. Countercyclical regulations would 
imply that capital and provisions would be raised 
above the minimum in good times, when risks are 
building up. This would facilitate the accumulation 
of buffers that could be used in the downturn, when 
consequences of previous risk-taking materialise, 
enhancing risk management at the ﬁ  rm level. While 
this approach must necessarily be forward-looking, 
it has to be anchored on historical data and overseen 
by prudential supervisors (so as to limit the risk 
of manipulation).
There is wide agreement on the merits of 
countercyclical provisioning and capital requirements. 
In particular, risk would be better mitigated through 
several channels:
(i) the absorption capacity channel, as a more 
forward-looking approach would provide more 
capacity to absorb losses when they occur;
(ii) the incentives channel, as proﬁ  ts would be better 
adjusted to longer-term risks. During a boom, under 
a countercyclical approach declared proﬁ  ts would be 
less prone to exaggeration and lower, leading to the 
distribution of smaller bonuses and less dividends 
and most likely resulting in a fairer valuation of stock 
prices. This would ensure that proﬁ  ts distributed 
during upturns do not include risk premia, as it seems 
to have been the case in the run-up to the current 
crisis;6 and
(iii) the portfolio shift channel, as banks could adjust 
their portfolios more smoothly if the identiﬁ  cation 
of risks were done earlier in the business cycle. 
This means that banks would be less prone to 
resort to ﬁ  re sales and curb lending in downturns: 
either the pressure on capital would be less than 
otherwise, or remedial action would have been taken 
6  Although this would still not prevent excessive risk-taking in good times, it would surely help mitigate its impact.
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earlier thanks to improved risk sensitivity. In turn, 
all this would have positive effects on long-term 
economic growth.
No doubt there is much work to be done to develop, 
agree on and implement the right methodologies 
linking provisions and capital to business cycle 
developments. Nevertheless, work has already started 
in earnest. The April 2009 FSF Report Addressing 
procyclicality in the ﬁ  nancial system represents a 
key milestone, as it includes recommendations 
suggesting methods to mitigate the procyclical 
effects of current regulatory practices. This work 
has beneﬁ  ted from strong support from the IMF, 
the Committee on the Global Financial System and 
the Basel Committee, especially on leverage and 
capital issues. Standard-setting bodies have embraced 
this agenda and are working to develop adequate 
methodologies to realise it. It is reasonable to expect 
that, when the next boom begins, there will be explicit 
features in capital, liquidity and provisioning rules 
in place along the lines outlined above.
3| REGULATION MUST DEAL 
WITH UNCERTAINTY
My third key element is that regulation should ﬁ  nd 
ways to deal with uncertainty. Indeed, a key challenge 
highlighted by the crisis is the limitations of the 
existing toolkit for dealing with unexpected events, 
particularly those that are infrequent and therefore 
unlikely. We turned out to know much less than we 
thought we did before the crisis. Key assumptions 
that underlie risk management models have come 
under scrutiny. Examples include the assumed 
normal shape of the risk distribution, the exceedingly 
short horizons for data records, the blindness to the 
possibility of herd behaviour, the inability to capture 
correlations, and the excessive reliance on market 
prices and past statistical relationships. However, 
all the ﬁ  nancial institutions using similar models 
did not take similar decisions, suggesting that the 
problem is larger. The governance process that should 
support good judgment and decisions failed as much 
as the models on which people relied. Boards of 
directors and management of ﬁ  nancial institutions 
were not always asking the right questions, often 
paying more attention to business volume than 
to risk management; proﬁ  ts were not analysed, 
and rewarded, on a risk-adjusted basis; and there 
were incentives to develop structures and new 
instruments to circumvent regulation and reduce 
short-term regulatory costs.
Hence, the recent crisis has shown that it is essential 
to both improve risk modelling techniques to factor 
in interactions and tail events and rely on judgment 
and experience to supplement mathematical analysis 
(not a new concept, but one that had tended to be 
forgotten).
But how can regulation help if models are inadequate, 
particularly in times of stress when they are needed 
the most, if uncertainty is difﬁ  cult to manage and if 
governance arrangements do not favour adequate risk 
culture in ﬁ  nancial institutions? The role of regulation, 
in short, should be to recognise the inadequacy of risk 
management frameworks to deal with uncertainty 
and to compensate for these shortcomings. Several 
possible ways to strengthen regulation in this respect 
may be considered:
￿  Building up larger cushions in capital, provisions 
and liquidity, so as to be prepared for uncertain 
adverse events.
￿  Multiple lines of defence against unexpected risks 
by looking at a wide array of indicators in both risk 
management (e.g. gross and net positions) and capital 
frameworks (e.g. simple and gross measures of risk, 
such as a leverage ratio).
￿ Automatic stabilisers to mitigate excessive 
risk-taking: given the difﬁ  culty in identifying uncertain 
events and avoiding delays in decision-taking as 
well as excessive optimism, cushions through the 
cycle should be built in as automatic stabilisers as 
much as possible, limiting the need for discretionary 
decision. There should, however, be an appropriate 
balance between automatic stabilisers and judgment 
by supervisors. An exclusive reliance on simple 
automatic rules could provide a false sense of comfort 
if the environment changes rapidly (e.g. ﬁ  nancial 
innovation).
￿ Access to better information to improve market 
oversight.
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4| FOSTER INCENTIVES FOR GOOD 
  RISK MANAGEMENT CONSISTENT 
  WITH FINANCIAL STABILITY
Fourth, regulation should foster adequate incentives 
for good risk management. This will also contribute 
to the preceding key element, because adequate 
incentives in ﬁ  nancial institutions to foster sound risk 
management, good governance, proper checks and 
balances, market discipline and the internalisation 
of interactions and systemic risk in business 
decisions can prove of particular importance once 
the unexpected happens.
A ﬁ  rst step, already being addressed by the Basel 
Committee, is to enhance the aspects of banking 
regulation to increase the resilience of the banking 
system through, in particular, strengthening the 
level and quality of capital and enhancing the global 
liquidity risk management framework.
More fundamentally perhaps, the need to reform 
regulation so as to better align private sector incentives 
with public goods such as ﬁ  nancial stability is in itself 
a key objective —at least as important as the need to 
build larger capital cushions. Certainly, making wrong 
investment decisions is not necessarily a market 
failure, provided that markets can self-correct their 
excesses at a perhaps painful but still tolerable cost. 
However, in the recent crisis market discipline was not 
effective enough and large-scale public intervention 
proved necessary —problems that would not have been 
resolved by simply asking for more regulatory capital.
Public attention has particularly focused on incentives 
within ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. While the boards of these 
institutions are entrusted with the oversight of the 
risk management process —including determining 
risk appetite, approving risk management strategies 
and ensuring that management takes actions 
commensurate with these strategies— many of them 
overlooked the frenzied risk accumulation and in some 
cases allowed irresponsible executive compensation 
schemes. Although the ﬁ  nancial industry should 
continue to be able to attract needed talents, it is 
clearly recognised that compensation schemes should 
stop providing the distorted incentives that helped 
amplify the recent crisis. In particular, the Basel 
Committee has worked on ways to strengthen risk 
management through Pillar 2 of the Basel Capital 
Framework. The FSF has proposed that compensation 
practices should be risk-adjusted and made consistent 
with the long-term goals of ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
Financial supervisors are also being called upon 
to review compensation schemes as part of their 
supervisory exercises.
Another ingredient of market discipline that fell short 
during the crisis was the role of credit rating agencies. 
Their failure in addressing the conﬂ  ict of interest 
between their advisory and rating roles has brought 
into question the use of their ratings in regulation. 
There were also failures in risk measurement and 
modelling, e.g. in the case of the ratings of structured 
products that had subprime mortgages embedded in 
them. Here, too, action has been initiated in several 
forums to enhance oversight of these agencies. IOSCO 
(International Organisation of Securities commissions) 
has developed a code of conduct which could form 
the basis of national frameworks, and the need for 
providing better disclosure on complex products to 
facilitate informed investment decisions has been 
highlighted. Important proposals have also been put 
forward by the Basel Committee to enhance market 
discipline in this area (enhancements of Pillar 3 of 
the Basel II Framework).
Yet, notwithstanding rating agencies’ shortcomings, 
many institutional investors had adequate instruments 
and resources to perform their own due diligence but 
failed to do so and appeared blindsided in their quest 
for yield. The boards of these institutions overlooked 
the build-up of risk in their portfolios, highlighting 
that more remains to be done to further strengthen 
governance in this sector as well.
Ensuring the consistency of both prudential and 
accounting regulation with good risk management 
practices is also important, not least because 
these rules greatly influence the behaviour of 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. It has long been argued that 
accounting rules aim at describing the balance sheet 
of an institution while the prudential approach is 
more forward-looking. This has led to a structural 
tension between the “incurred loss” model of the 
accounting world and the “expected loss” model 
of risk management and prudential regulations. 
On the accounting side, one worry is that a 
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forward-looking approach provides management 
with some discretion to manipulate earnings, 
thereby hurting investors. On  the supervision 
side, one concern is that accounting rules that are 
backward-looking do not allow buffers to be built 
up when risks accumulate so as to meet future 
losses, undermining the soundness of the ﬁ  rm and 
exacerbating procyclicality. One positive outcome of 
this crisis is the apparent willingness to agree on a 
common ground which would address both concerns. 
Under the auspices of the FSF, both accountants and 
supervisors have looked deeply into the issues of 
valuation of ﬁ  nancial instruments and provisioning. 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
have been invited to reconsider the incurred loss 
model in order to recognise and measure loan losses 
that incorporate a broader range of available credit 
information. This would clearly narrow the gap with 
expected loss calculations, which incorporate past 
information that can be much richer than in the 
current, narrow, incurred loss approach.




My ﬁ  fth key element is that cross-border cooperation 
is of the essence. National solutions to ﬁ  nancial 
system problems are unlikely to work effectively 
in today’s globalised ﬁ  nancial system, where large 
ﬁ  nancial institutions straddle the world. Nor is it 
worthwhile to contemplate returning to a world 
with capital ﬂ  ow barriers. The solution is to ﬁ  nd 
better ways to coordinate surveillance, oversight and 
policy responses across borders, thereby alleviating 
tensions between home and host countries. 
The importance of this issue has been highlighted 
during the current crisis. Uncoordinated policy actions 
at the national level led to defensive responses from 
other countries and possibly aggravated the early stage 
of the turmoil. Accordingly, several actions have been 
proposed to ensure more coordination in the future. 
The FSF has moved ahead with the development of 
principles to govern the scope, role and operations 
of supervisory colleges, which have been established 
for most of the identiﬁ  ed large ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. The 
Basel Committee has in addition broadened the 
mandate of its Standards Implementation Group to 
concentrate on implementation of Basel Committee 
guidance, and all banking supervisory standards 
more generally.
But progress will be difﬁ  cult in part because some 
important issues fall outside the normal scope 
of supervisors and risk remaining unaddressed. 
These are prickly areas of national sovereignty, 
implying that only strong political commitment 
can effectively reduce cross-border differences. 
For instance, legislative frameworks dealing with 
bank rescue intervention and insolvency have to be 
more compatible across jurisdictions to ensure the 
convergence of key policies such as early remedial 
action and intervention in the case of the failure of 
cross-border ﬁ  rms.
As highlighted by the recent crisis, such coordination 
will not be effective if not underpinned by some kind of 
institutional arrangement and strong political support 
promoting the convergence of national frameworks 
across sectors. This is also important to ensure a level 
playing ﬁ  eld in the ﬁ  nancial industry.
6| ENFORCE REGULATION 
PROACTIVELY AND DEVOTE 
MORE RESOURCES
My sixth and ﬁ  nal key element is that setting adequate 
regulation is not enough if not properly enforced. The 
rules of the game do not matter without the ability 
and/or willingness to respect them. Even though it 
would have been better to have clearer regulation rules 
before the crisis, more could have been done under 
the existing regulatory framework, and supervisors 
did not use all the room for manoeuvre at their 
disposal. For example, it is now widely acknowledged 
that the relaxation of their underwriting standards 
and the growth of their off-balance sheet positions 
in the run-up to the crisis did not attract the desired 
supervisory responses.
The G20 has already picked up on this issue of 
regulation enforcement and has called upon 
national authorities to ensure the independence 
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and effectiveness of their regulatory activities. 
This should be complemented by a broader discussion 
on what should be done to ensure stronger oversight 
of the ﬁ  nancial system in practice. Speciﬁ  c actions 
should be taken to provide the regulatory function 
with the necessary mandate, resources, operational 
independence and corresponding accountability so 
that the rules being set up are followed.
Good regulation has to be supported by equally good 
supervision, which must be able to act in a timely and 
credible fashion. Supervisory agencies must therefore 
also have adequate resources, in particular the ability 
to hire, train and retain skilled professionals. This is 
still not the case in a number of jurisdictions.7
This last point is even more important given that 
the role of supervisors is changing at a rapid pace. 
7  For example, the IMF paper “Implementation of the Basel core principles for effective banking supervision: experience with assessments and implications 
for future work”, prepared by the Staff of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, 2 September 2008, suggests that over a third of the sample of 137 assessed 
countries did not meet the criteria on the principle for operational independence and adequate resources, and points to the lack of experienced supervisors, training 
budgets, the inability to retain qualiﬁ  ed staff due to low salary scales, and competition from the industry.
The last decade saw a shift in their roles, from the 
simple monitoring of how ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms comply 
with regulation towards a more risk-focused 
approach. The next decade is likely to expand the 
supervisory focus further, from prudential regulation 
and ﬁ  rm-level risk assessment to macroprudential 
supervision and systemic risk determination. 
These changes will no doubt require signiﬁ  cant 
additional resources and skills, not least to ensure 
the degree of operational independence required 
by supervisory actions to be credible and timely, 
and broader institutional reforms in some places. 
Though this issue has not yet gained visibility in 
the various discussions and reports emerging from 
the crisis, the question of resources is likely to 
be crucial in determining whether the reformed 
regulatory framework can effectively deal with the 
next ﬁ  nancial crisis.
It is heartening to note that work has begun on almost all ﬁ  nancial regulatory fronts. If properly implemented, 
my sense is that the roadmap presented here can provide assurance that things will be better on the next 
occasion of ﬁ  nancial stress. However, cycles are an inevitable facet of the economy. The pursuit of policies 
to dampen procyclicality and moderate excessive risk-taking could also have a moderating effect on growth 
during speciﬁ  c periods of time. Policymakers should be prepared for these effects, taking comfort in the 
fact that growth would be more sustainable and stable in the longer run, and that the cost of future ﬁ  nancial 
crises could be minimised.
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